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The purpose of this study is to find out if the income premium from university entrance 
differs with respect to prior achievement as measured by previous grades. Using income at the 
age of 28 to 30, we analyze if high-achievers have larger income premiums from entering 
university than low-achievers in a sample of Swedish upper secondary school students. We 
find that income differences generally are positive, albeit larger for females than for males. It 
is also found that the income premium is larger for high-achievers than for low-achievers. 
However,  especially  for  males,  the  income  premium  rises  only  marginally  with  prior 
achievement for a large part of the grade distribution, indicating that there are only small 
differences in the returns to university entrance for a majority of upper secondary school 
graduates.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There  are  different  underlying  principles  for  how  the  selection  into  higher  education  is 
organised. Wolming (1999) describes three main approaches that admissions systems usually 
are  based  on,  either  separately  or  in  combination.  One  approach  is  egalitarian.  Here  all 
eligible applicants are selected or a system of lottery is used, where all eligible applicants 
receive  the  same  chance  of  being  selected.  A  second  approach  is  when  the  selection  of 
applicants is based on a utilitarian principle. According to Epicurus’ rule of utility it is the 
approach that brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. In this context 
the focus of utility may be on all the stakeholders and not necessarily only the students. The 
third (and most common approach) is meritocracy. In a meritocratic approach the applicants 
are ranked by previous merits manifested in grades or test scores, and selected accordingly. 
The assumptions are that this approach is perceived as transparent and fair, but also that the 
students who are high performing will perform better in higher education than students with 
lower performances. If the correlation between instrument and the criteria for study success is 
strong, the instrument is said to have high predictive validity or predictive strength.  
 
In many systems, upper secondary grades are used as indicators of relevant merits for higher 
education, and therefore used both for eligibility purposes and instruments for ranking and 
selecting the students. Combining these two purposes is not without problems, however, since 
the grades are designed to give information about what a student know and can do at the time 
when the grade is given, but not necessarily what the student can do in the future. There are 
also expectations of rank ordering – the higher the grade or test score, the better will the 
students perform – but also of discrimination between those who will “succeed” and those 
who will not (see Figure 1 below).  
 
Figure 1 HERE 
 
The quality and characteristics of the selection instrument are important for several reasons. 
The stakes are high for the applicants – they naturally want to have a fair chance of being 
admitted but not necessarily be admitted if it turns out they did not have the required previous 
knowledge to succeed or benefit from the education. There are also a number of potential 
consequences  for  other  stakeholders  if  incorrect  decisions  are  made.  The  quality  of  the 
selection instruments is usually determined through its validity, e.g. the instrument’s ability to 	 ﾠ 3	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give the expected information without leading to unintended consequences (Messick, 1989). 
In selection to higher education, its predictive validity is of course of special interest (Lyrén, 
2008; Wolming, 1999). To investigate the predictive validity of an instrument, the criterion 
measure  is  important.  In  studies  of  higher  education,  the  criterion  is  often  some  kind  of 
performance measure, in the form of grades or credits. 
  
The  principle  for  validation  studies  is  simple  –  the  predictive  strength  is  the  correlation 
between  instrument  and  criterion  measure.  However,  in  practice,  such  studies  are  often 
problematic. First of all there is often more than one instrument.  For instance, in the Swedish 
system there are two selection instruments to higher education, the grade point average (GPA) 
from upper secondary school and an optional admission test (the SweSAT). The GPA and the 
SweSAT are not combined, however, as is the case in most other systems where there are two 
instruments, but used separately. Applicants who have both will be put in two admissions 
groups and admitted from the group where he or she is ranked the highest. Universities must 
admit at least thirty percent from each admissions group. Selection effects make it difficult to 
perform validation studies, as practically all applicants have upper secondary school grades 
but not all have taken the test.  
 
The criterion can also be problematic, for instance when traditional indicators for academic 
performance, such as grades or graduation are used, and scales, grading practices or standards 
varies within and between programmes. This is the case for Sweden; there is no common 
scale at the university level, but in many courses and programmes the students are graded 
with either a fail or a pass, which means that there will be little or no variation in the criterion. 
A common solution is to use university credits: a student is regarded successful if he/she takes 
the expected number of credits per term or year, and the more credits, the better.
1  One 
problem with this approach is that it is not necessarily the successful students who take the 
larger number of credits. A student who is attractive on the job market may leave university 
education before the student who is less attractive or unable to find a job and hence decides to 
stay on and take more courses. Furthermore, it is also problematic that missing credits due to 
study breaks caused by childbirth, illness or sabbaticals will be incorrectly interpreted as non-
success. 
1	 ﾠThere is a fairly large number of Swedish studies that address the predictive validity of one or both of the 
selection instruments mentioned in the text (e.g. Henriksson and Wolming, 1998; Svensson, Gustafsson and 
Reuterberg, 2001; and Svensson and Nielsen, 2004). See also Wolming & Wikström, 2010 for an overview. 
Internationally, there is an extensive literature dealing with predicting university grades by high school GPA or 
SAT scores, see e.g. Cohn et al. (2004) and the references therein.	 ﾠ	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Another shortcoming that characterizes prediction studies is that the criterion (study success) 
only  can  be  observed  for  those  who  enter  higher  education  (correct  prediction  and  false 
positive in figure 1). This means that the predictive strength of an instrument is determined 
solely on a within-group comparison of students admitted. This means that prediction studies 
are rooted in a meritocratic system. If one opens up for other possible guiding principles of 
how to organize selection, such as the utilitarian, statements about counterfactual outcomes 
may become important. In a utilitarian system, we may interpret predictive strength in relation 
to what would have been had the student not been admitted. In such a comparison, a high 
achieving student obtaining a larger number of credits/higher GPA should not necessarily be 
admitted ahead of, say, a middle-achiever since the former may have a better outcome under 
non-admittance. This kind of interpretation is related to the economic approach of studying 
the “returns” to education.
2 From society’s point of view, students with a large expected 
income premium from education (or rather admission) may be more beneficial to promote 
into university than students with a low expected premium. Consequently, there is reason to 
consider alternatives to traditional prediction studies, to avoid the limitations discussed above 
and also to revisit the definition of the criterion “academic success”.  
 
In this paper, an alternative approach to the traditional prediction studies is explored. Since 
university education is expected to lead to future employment, and successful students should 
be attractive on the job market, employment and earnings should be relevant indicators of 
study success. Hence, the main aim of this paper is to study the relationship between how 
students fare on the selection instrument and how successful they are on the job market. Since 
earnings are strongly related to educational outcomes, it is reasonable to use earnings as an 
indicator of academic success. Consequently, our assumption that income is a criterion for 
academic success may be an alternative if direct performance (in terms of grades) in higher 
education is difficult to observe. Moreover, earnings are available for all students that have 
entered  the  labour  market,  making  it  possible  to  compare  individuals  entering  higher 
education with similar individuals that do not enter with respect to the selection criteria. In 
this  paper  we  will  focus  on  the  upper  secondary  GPA  as  selection  instrument  to  higher 
education.  Earnings  measured  at  labour  market  entrance  are  used  as  the  criterion.  Our 
2	 ﾠ The  return  to  education  usually  applies  to  completed  education,  and  not,  as  in  this  paper,  entrance  into 
education.  See  Mincer  (1974)  for  the  basic  interpretations  of  the  human  capital  model  and  the  returns  to 
education  and  Psacharopoulos  and  Patrinos  (2004)  for  empirical  results  from  a  large  number  of  studies 
connected to this literature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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measure  of  academic  success  is  the  income  premium  of  admission  into  university.  The 
empirical analysis uses data including Swedish students born 1972 to 1974 that graduated 
from  a  theoretically  oriented  upper  secondary  school  program.  A  prior  achievement 
interaction effect is estimated, with the purpose of studying if the income premium differs 
conditional on differences in the selection instrument. 
 
Apart from extending the previous literature by using earnings as an outcome variable and 
studying the income premium from entrance, the paper also adds to the literature in other 
ways. First, we characterize the prior achievement interaction effect using a theoretical model, 
where the main differences between the criterion used in the paper and the previously used 
criterion  can  be  discussed.  Second,  interpreting  the  income  premium  from  university 
admission is not without problems. We therefore discuss sources of misinterpretation that 
have to do with identification of the prior achievement interaction effect. Third, the paper also 
connects to the literature of successful educational policy from a macro-oriented perspective, 
and in particular the literature on the expansion of the educational system.
3 Although our 
paper does not study the development of the return to education during a period of university 
expansion, the empirical part of the paper concerns a period when the number of enrolees into 
higher education greatly increased in Sweden. As such it is interesting to see how a relatively 
large number of weak students (in terms of prior school grades) fare relative to other entrants.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two a theoretical model is developed. 
The  main  purpose  is  to  describe  the  differences  between  the  labour  market  information 
approach and the traditional approach that uses grade points or credits as criteria. We show 
how these measures are connected, and we also discuss problems interpreting the resulting 
association  (between  school  grades  and  income  premium)  because  of  selection  on 
unobservable characteristics that we cannot fully control for. Section three describes the data 
and the methods used in the paper. We propose several different ways of how to estimate the 
prior achievement interaction effect. The empirical application is based on three cohorts of 
students on academic track in upper secondary school entering higher education relatively 
soon after high school completion. In section four the results are presented, and in section five 
some concluding remarks are made.  
	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠSee Osborne (2003) for a study on the expansion of higher education in Europe. Walker and Zhu (2008) study 
the development of college wage premium in Great Britain.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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2. A model for interpreting the prior achievement interaction effect 
 
We assume that the observed earnings of an individual reflect factors related to education; 
y = y a,x ( ), where y denotes earnings, a achievement at university, and  x prior achievement 
(corresponding  to  upper  secondary  school  or  high-school).  Earnings  are  assumed  to  be 
increasing and strictly concave in both arguments, meaning that the labour market values both 
types of achievement but at a decreasing rate. Let super indices e and 0 denote entrants and 
non-entrants respectively. The earnings difference between a university entrant and a non-
entrant, for a given prior achievement level, can be expressed as  !y = y
e " y
0. The main 
concern here is to evaluate how the income difference between entrants and non-entrants 












          (1) 
 
We will denote equation (1) the prior achievement interaction effect. First, we will discuss a 
model  suggesting  how  to  interpret  the  prior  achievement  interaction  effect,  and  how  it 
compares to direct outcome measures of academic achievement. Then we will discuss the 
implications of unobservable heterogeneity on the estimates of the interaction effect.   
 
A behavioural response to prior achievement 
 
We shall start by discussing a model for the determination of educational quality as the main 
choice  mechanism  for  university  students.  We  do  this  by  assuming  that  students  choose 
programs/courses  of  different  quality.  Quality  can  perhaps  best  be  interpreted  as  study 
intensity chosen by the student, and intensity will be rewarded in the labour market. However, 
one may also imagine that the quality dimension refers to the duration of studies, and that 
programmes of longer duration are higher paid. Let t denote the quality of university studies, 
and let achievement from university studies be given by a production function  a = a t,x,! ( ), 
where  x as before denotes prior achievement, and  !  is denoted study motivation. Study 
motivation  is  here  used  in  the  meaning  of  traits  that  are  not  directly  observable  to  the 
researcher, among other things focus and persistence.
4 University achievement is assumed to 
4	 ﾠSee Pintrich and Schunk (2002) for a lenghty discussion on the concept of study motivation.	 ﾠ	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be increasing in all three arguments. In addition, it is natural to assume decreasing returns to 
quality  (att < 0),  and  it  also  appears  logical  to  assume  that  prior  achievement  and  study 
motivation boosts learning at university at the margin, i.e. atx ! 0 and at! " 0 .
5  
 
The cost of studying is captured by a cost function, c x,! ( )"t , that for simplicity is assumed to 
be linear in study intensity. The average cost,  c x,! ( ), reflects direct costs as well as psychic 
costs. For our purposes, we model average cost as a function of prior achievement and study 
motivation, assuming that the average cost is decreasing in both arguments, reflecting that the 
cost of study effort is decreasing in prior knowledge as well as study motivation. A university 
student chooses t to maximise the utility given by earnings net of the cost of studying, i.e. 
u
e = y a(t,x,!),x ( )"c x,! ( )#t .  The  first-order  condition  for  this  problem  is 
ut
e = ya ! ( )at ! ( )"c ! ( )# 0,  where  the  first  term  reflects  the  returns  to  quality  (the  marginal 
returns to achievement times the marginal product of study intensity) and the second term the 
marginal cost of quality.  To characterise how the intensity of university studies varies with 
prior achievement and study motivation, the first-order condition is differentiated with respect 
to  t,  x,  and  !   to  get  the  comparative  statics  results  !t !k = "utk
e utt
e ,  k = x,! .  Note  that 
sign !t !k ( )= sign utk
e ( )  since  the  second-order  condition  for  maximum  is  negative  by 
assumption.  
 
Starting with prior achievement, the derivative of interest is  utx
e = ya
eatx !cx + yax
e + yaa
e ax ( )at.  
The two first terms on the right hand side are positive. The first term reflects that the marginal 
effect of intensity on achievement is increasing in prior achievement and the second term that 
the cost of education is decreasing in prior achievement. The term within brackets cannot be 
signed a priori. This part reflects how the marginal return to achievement is affected by prior 
achievement. First, higher prior achievement may increase or decrease intensity depending on 
whether the labour market valuation of the two types of merits are regarded as complements 
or substitutes. One would expect this term to be positive if education at secondary school 
complements education at the university level. However, if employers place value on the 
highest-level degree only, then this term may be zero, and it may even be negative. The 
second term is negative and reflects the assumption that the marginal return to academic 
achievement is a decreasing function. The effect of study motivation is very similar to the 
5	 ﾠLowercase letters denote partial derivatives.	 ﾠ	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effect of prior achievement. The derivative is  utx
e = ya
eat! "c! + yaa
e ata! , which apart from the 
complementary effect has similar interpretations. To sum up, prior achievement and study 
motivation increases study intensity since they decrease the cost of education and since they 
boost  the  marginal  productivity  of  university  quality.  A  counteracting  factor  is  the  direct 
effect on achievement making the marginal productivity of intensity less attractive because of 
decreasing returns to education. This means that it is very likely that prior achievement and 
study motivation have the same qualitative effect on study intensity. It is also likely that the 
intensity is increasing in x and! , although we cannot rule out the opposite on theoretical 
grounds. 
 
Denoting by  t x,! ( ) the choice of study intensity, earnings of an entrant can be expressed 
asy
e = y a t x,! ( ),x,! ( ),x " # $ %, and the earnings of a non-entrant is  y
0 = y 0,x [ ]. Let us now turn 





e attx +ax [ ]+ yx
e # yx
0 $ % & '         (1’) 
 
The effect of prior achievement on the earnings difference has two sources. The first part on 
the right hand side of (1’) is related to the marginal valuation of the university education in 
the  labour  market.  The  two  terms  within  the  first  brackets  are  the  effects  on  academic 
achievement. This is what is measured when using achievement measures, such as GPA to 
assess study success. Prior achievement boosts achievement at the university directly (the 
second term within the first bracket) and indirectly via the choice of study intensity (the first 
term).    As  long  as  prior  achievement  increases  study  intensity  then  both  these  terms  are 
positive. Academic achievement is then valued at the margin (captured by the term  ya
e). Note 
that, as long as a positive valuation is placed on academic achievement in the labour market, 
we expect a positive association between traditional achievement measures and earnings.  
 
The second part on the right hand side reflects the difference in the (marginal) valuation of 
prior achievement in the labour market between the two groups. As before, the sign and size 
of this effect depends on how the marginal return with respect to prior achievement depends 
on academic achievement, and this in turn depends on how employers value the two forms of 
education; how valuable is a marginal increase in prior GPA if I have a university diploma 	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
versus how valuable is a GPA increase if I do not? From the discussion above it is clear that 
one should not interpret the prior achievement interaction effect as a structural parameter as it 
is composed of different effects that may vary over time and over different subgroups. Using 
earnings information and information on prior achievement, it is straightforward to obtain an 
estimate of the total effect, and it is also possible to obtain an estimate of the effect of prior 
achievement among non-entrants (yx
0 ). In order to disentangle the other effects, however, one 
would need information that is usually not observed on a regular basis; e.g. the study effort 
put in by students or employer valuation of prior GPA among university entrants. 
 
Problems with interpreting the interaction effect 
 
One important question here is to what extent a measure of the interaction effect reflects the 
true  dependence  between  prior  achievement  and  income  differences  (as  well  as  prior 
achievement  and  academic  achievement).  If  the  purpose  of  the  analysis  is  to  serve  as  a 
foundation for policy analysis, for example if upper secondary school grades successfully can 
be used to restrict access to higher education, this issue is of vital importance. Here, we will 
discuss two types of biases in the estimate of the interaction effect that may potentially arise. 
Both  of  them  have  to  do  with  selection  into  higher  education  because  of  factors  that 
researchers  cannot  observe.  First,  because  of  self-selection,  study  motivation  will  be 
unequally distributed among entrants with different prior achievement. Second, since prior 
achievement is correlated with study motivation at the pre-university level, an estimate of the 
dependence between prior achievement and the earnings difference may be biased simply 
because study motivation at the two educational levels are correlated.  
 
To  see  the  first  type  of  bias,  suppose  an  individual  will  enter  university  if  the  utility  of 
entering is at least as large as the utility of not entering (u
e ! u
0). Let the pair  ˆ x, ˆ ! ( ) define a 
marginal individual that is indifferent between entering higher education and continuing to the 
labour market directly after high school, i.e. u
e = u
0  or 
 
y a t(ˆ x, ˆ !), ˆ x, ˆ ! " # $ %, ˆ x ( )&c ˆ x, ˆ ! ( )'t ˆ x, ˆ ! ( )& y 0, ˆ x ( )( 0. 
 
Differentiating this expression with respect to x and !  and rearranging, one obtains 	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!"
!x x=ˆ x,"= ˆ "
= #
ya








) *          (2) 
 
A sufficient condition for the term within brackets in (2) to be positive is that  yx
e ! yx
0 " 0. 
This difference is related to the valuation of the two types of degrees as complements, i.e. if 
yax > 0. Thus, for example, if the two types of education are valued independently of each 
other, then  yx
e ! yx
0 = 0 and the condition in (2) is negative. This would mean that students 
with a high prior achievement that do not enter university have low study motivation and vice 
versa; students with low prior achievement that enter university have high study motivation. If 
we for the moment assume that study motivation is uniformly distributed across all prior 
achievement levels, then the average study motivation is falling in prior achievement among 
the  entrants  into  university,  meaning  that  study  motivation  and  prior  achievement  is 
negatively correlated in the group of entrants. Therefore, if one fails to take study motivation 
into account in an empirical analysis, the estimate of the interaction effect is likely downward 
biased as long as study motivation has a positive impact on the interaction effect.  
 
The second type of bias suggested arises if study motivation at the two different levels of 
education is correlated. Suppose that prior achievement to some extent depends upon study 
motivation at the pre-university level. Then if study motivation at the two levels is positively 
correlated as we expect, prior achievement will be positively correlated with study motivation 
at  the  academic  level.  Therefore,  unobserved  motivation  will  in  this  case  give  rise  to  an 
upward bias of the estimate of the interaction effect. The net effect of the two causes means 
that failing to take unobserved motivation into account, the interaction effect may be biased 
upwards  as  well  as  downward.  It  is  very  difficult  to  deal  with  the  bias  caused  by  study 
motivation. To some extent one may of course capture study motivation by controlling for 
traits known to be related to motivation, e.g. social group and parental education. However, it 
is likely to differ within these groups as well, implying that control variables are unlikely to 
eliminate the bias all together. Therefore, one should be careful in using estimates of the 
interaction effect for the purpose of policy analysis. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
Selection of data 
 
Register data from Statistics Sweden is used to study the earnings effects from entrance into 
universities. The sample drawn consists of individuals born between 1972 and 1974 who 
graduated from academic track programs in Swedish upper secondary schools. In Sweden, a 
large  majority  of  teenagers  enter  upper  secondary  school  at  the  age  of  16.  Among  the 
individuals born 1972 to 1974, nearly 80 percent had graduated from upper secondary school 
by 1996. Out of these, 46 percent (127 000 individuals) had attended a program on academic 
track.    The  outcome  variable  used  is  the  sum  of  income  from  employment  and  self-
employment in the year 2002. This means that our study measures the incomes of individuals 
as they are in the age span 28 to 30 years. This is a reasonable measure of early career 
outcomes for individuals that attained higher education considering that the large majority of 
the students that go on to university do so either directly after finishing upper secondary 
schools or in their early twenties. 
 
Our data regarding the registration of individuals into the universities cover the years up to 
2002. In order to make a fair comparison between university entrants and non-entrants, only 
university  entrants  that  were  registered  at  a  Swedish  university  before  the  year  1996  are 
included. Students that were registered first time between 1996 and 2001 are excluded. There 
are two main reasons for this delimitation. First, one must allow a sufficient amount of time to 
pass between university entrance and observation in the labour market, so that the individual 
has the opportunity to finish higher education. Second, since we are interested in earnings 
differences in the different parts of the grade distribution, we would not like the estimates to 
be influenced by the possibility that individuals with low grades enter universities at a later 
date than high-performing individuals. Indeed, if we look at the data, the university entrance 
date is negatively correlated with the GPA in upper secondary school. Including only those 
university students that entered before 1996 means that the students have had at least seven 
years from their university registration date to the year when we observe their income. 
 
The  comparison  group  (non-entrants)  is  formed  by  including  the  individuals  that  did  not 
register into a university before the year 2002. Moreover we require the individuals to be 
registered as employed in the autumn of 2002. All together this means that out of the 127 000 
students  that  graduated  from  upper  secondary  school  academic  track  programs,  15  000 	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
students are dropped as they registered into a university after 1995, and approximately 19 000 
are dropped since they were not working in the autumn of 2002, leaving 93 268 observations 
in the final sample. The number of female students is slightly larger (48 107) than the number 
of  male  students  (45  161).  In  the  estimations,  observations  with  missing  information  are 
excluded,  meaning  that  the  sample  sizes  are  substantially  lower  when  we  control  for 
background  information.  Definitions  of  the  variables  used  in  the  empirical  analysis  are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix, and descriptive statistics is presented in Table A2.  
 
GPA quintile groups  
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the main research strategy is to compare the income 
differences between university entrants and non-entrants over the upper secondary grade point 
averages,  and  we  do  this  by  comparing  students  in  different  GPA-groups.  This  section 
contains a description of different GPA groups where students have been divided into five 
groups of equal size, where the 20 percent lowest achieving form group one. Male students 
and  female  students  are  treated  separately.  Forming  quintile  groups  using  grade  point 
averages will create a large number of ties. Rather than splitting ties to create groups of 
exactly equal size, we choose the convention to include the upper limit value in the lower 
group. In particular, this means that the lowest achieving group will exceed 20 percent and the 
highest achieving group will contain less than 20 percent of the observations. However, in no 
case the smallest group will contain less than 18 percent of the observations.  
 
In the norm-referenced grading system that these students were graded according to, GPA 
varies between 1 and 5. Table 1 shows the percentage of university entrants in the different 
quintile groups, as well as the relative size and the upper limit associated with each group in 
our sample of data. 
 
Table 1 HERE  
 
As can be seen from the table, very few of the top-performing students in academic track 
programmes choose not to enrol in university studies in Sweden. Among the top-performing 
men 98 percent are university entrants, and 97.5 percent of the females are registered at a 
university.  Among  the  low-achievers,  the  proportions  of  university  entrants  are  lower; 
approximately 30 percent of the men and 36 percent of the females.  	 ﾠ 13	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Table 2 HERE 
 
2002 incomes among the university entrants and non-entrants are shown in Table 2.  The 
average  female  income  in  the  sample  was  213  000  SEK  in  2002.  One  can  note  that  the 
average income of high-performing females that were not enrolled in a university did not 
reach the average income level, meaning that most females that did not enter into a university 
had  below  the  average  income.  Earnings  tend  to  increase  with  GPA  in  upper  secondary 
school.  This  is  especially  true  for  university-enrolled  females,  while  the  income-GPA 
association  is  much  weaker  for  non-entrants.  This  suggests  that  the  income  differences 
between entrants and non-entrants tend to increase with the GPA in upper secondary school.  
 
The  male  income  also  increases  with  the  GPA  in  upper  secondary  school.  However,  in 
contrast to the incomes among women, the highest performing non-entrants (quintile 5) earn 
well in excess of a large majority of the university-enrolled men. Another observation worth 
mentioning  is  that  the  relative  income  differences  between  entrants  and  non-entrants  are 
smaller than the corresponding figures for the women. Finally one should note that there are 




The effects of education on subsequent incomes are usually studied by estimating the returns 
to education (Mincer, 1974). A basic idea is that education is an investment that will yield 
pay-off in the form of improved future labour market outcomes. The by now standard method 
to address the returns to education is to compare the incomes of individuals with different 
years of completed education or those with and without a specified education. However, since 
our main purpose is to discuss the differences with respect to university entrance, the concept 
of  returns  to  education  in  this  case  means  the  returns  to  university  entrance,  thus  not 
conditioning on programme completion. Let y denote income for individual i. The baseline 
empirical specification is 
 
lnyi = f ENTRi,GPAi ( )+!GPAi + zi +"i         (3) 
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where the dependent variable is the logarithm of income. In all specification, we assume that 
income develops linearly with the upper secondary school GPA,  f ENTRi,GPAi ( )is some 
function (to be discussed below) of university entrance and the grade point average from 
upper secondary school capturing the prior achievement interaction effect, z denotes a set of 
background variables and associated parameters capturing the influence of individual traits 
and  differences  in  upper  secondary  schooling.  Finally,  ! is  an  error  term  capturing 
unobserved heterogeneity. Of key interest here is the interaction between the upper secondary 
school GPA and entrance on income. Since the function f is unknown a priori, it is important 
to estimate its’ parameters using a flexible functional form. We therefore choose to work with 
three  different  functional  forms.  As  a  first  specification,  the  samples  of  individuals  are 
divided into different GPA groups, and between group differences are estimated.  
In a second specification, f is modelled as a piecewise linear function (linear spline function) 
for  the  income  differences,  and  in  the  third  type  of  specification,  the  interaction  effect 
potentially develops non-linearly using higher order polynomials. See equation A1-A3 in the 
Appendix for details. As a general estimation strategy, for each of the specifications, we start 
by estimating a general model and then test if restricting some or all of its parameters can 
reduce the model. 
 
Covariates 
A  number  of  covariates  are  used  in  order  to  take  heterogeneity,  such  as  unobserved 
motivation  differences,  into  account,  as  well  as  controlling  for  income  differences  not 
necessarily related to previous achievement. Apart from the upper secondary school GPA, we 
impose controls for age, immigration status, parental education, and primary school grades. 
At the time the individuals in the sample studied at upper secondary school, students on 
academic track could participate in five different programmes. Using dummy variables, we 
control for the upper secondary school programme attained. The major reason for including 
controls  for  educational  orientation  is  that  grading  in  upper  secondary  school  may  differ 
between upper secondary school programmes.  
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4. Results 
 
GPA quintile specific income differences 
Let us start by presenting the results from estimating the regression model using the step-wise 
interaction model presented in equation 4. In order to obtain a suitable empirical specification, 
the male and female samples are first divided into deciles with respect to upper secondary 
GPA, and equations with ten level effects and interaction effects are estimated. We then test if 
the model can be reduced to five quintile groups with separate interaction effects. It turns out 
that five interaction effects describes the data well, so in the continuation quintile specific 
interaction effects are presented. In Table 3, the results from the female income equations are 
presented, and the corresponding estimates for the males are presented in Table 4. The first 
column shows a parsimonious version of the model, where the only control variable is the 
upper secondary GPA, and the quintile group level effects. In column II background control 
variables are added, and in the third column upper secondary school educational orientation is 
added as well. To save on space, only the estimated income differences by GPA quintile 
group are presented. A full set of results can be obtained from the authors. 
 
Table 3 HERE 
 
Table 4 HERE 
 
Introducing background and educational orientation controls have only small effects on the 
estimated income differences, indicating that background controls do not appear to be very 
important for the interaction between entrance and GPA. In the male models (Table 4), the 
estimates are lowered somewhat for the two top quintile groups when introducing background 
controls, indicating that unobserved motivation may render the interaction effects to biased 
downwards, while in the female models, if anything, the difference is the opposite. In the 
female model specifications, the income differences between entrants and non-entrants are 
found to be positive and statistically significant for all quintile groups. Entrants in the lowest 
achieving group earn approximately six percent more than non-entrants, and this difference 
increases with prior achievement for each of the subgroups up to 32 percent in the top quintile 
group. These results indicate that there may be large differences in the returns to entrance 
among the females on academic track. The male earnings differences (see Table 4) are much 
smaller than the female differences. The lowest 60 percent of the males earns approximately 	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
the  same  independently  of  whether  they  entered  a  university  or  not.    The  difference  is 
approximately eight percent in the fourth quintile and ten percent in the top quintile; however 
the latter is not statistically significant.  
 
A  common  feature  of  the  males  and  female  samples  studied  here  is  that  the  income 
differences between entrants and non-entrants appear to grow with the upper secondary GPA, 
indicating  that  the  income-GPA  profiles  are  steeper  among  the  entrants.  In  order  to  test 
formally if there are group-wise differences, and if income differences are growing in GPA, 
we proceed by testing hypotheses of no differences between various subgroups using Wald 
tests. The results are presented in Table 5 and based on the estimates of column III in tables 3 
and 4. The first row of Table 5 tests the null hypothesis of no differences between the two 
bottom quintiles, the second row between the three bottom quintiles, and so on. Starting with 
the female income differences, we find that equality of the income differences in the two 
bottom quintiles are clearly not rejected, while equality among the three bottom quintiles is 
marginally accepted using the 95-percent level as the cut-off. However, we can reject equality 
among the four lowest or all five of the quintiles. Together with the fact that the estimated 
interaction effects are growing in GPA, these results imply that the income difference grows 
with the GPA. 
 
Table 5 HERE 
 
Applying the same tests on the male estimates give results that are similar to the female 
income differences. Here, equal income differences are rejected among the lowest four or all 
five of the quintile groups, and we may interpret the association between income differences 
and GPA as an increasing relation. One interesting aspect of these results is that, the income 
differences  appear  to  be  approximately  constant  among  the  lower  achieving  groups.  In 
particular,  we  do  not  find  big  differences  between  the  lowest  achieving  and  those  in  the 
middle of the grade scale.  The lowest achieving group are those with particularly poor grades 
and one would expect them to have worse outcomes in terms of the return to entrance. One 
should also note that in the two top quintiles, more than 90 percent entered a university during 
the period studied. Thus, the private value of entering a university is well captured by this 
group. 
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Alternative specifications 
Estimating between group differences may not capture all the aspect of the distribution of 
entrance returns with respect to prior achievement. Let us therefore present the estimates of 
the alternative specifications. The numerical results are presented in the appendix. First, the 
piecewise linear interaction model, defined in equation (A2), is estimated by dividing the 
male and female samples into deciles by GPA and then estimating slope parameters for each 
of the ten groups. A general to specific testing procedure is used in this case, where the 
parameter with the lowest level of significance is restricted to zero, and then the model is re-
estimated.  The  procedure  is  repeated  until  all  the  remaining  parameters  are  significantly 
determined at the 95 percent level. In a similar way the polynomial interaction model (see 
equation A3) is estimated. Here, we start by assuming a polynomial expression of order nine, 
and  then  reduce  the  model  by  restricting  the  highest  order  parameter  to  zero  until  the 
remaining  parameters  are  significantly  determined.  The  results  from  the  piecewise  linear 
interaction model are presented in Table A3, and the results from the polynomial model in 
Table A4. Since both the piecewise linear interaction model and the polynomial interaction 
model contain the linear interaction model as a special case, we also display the results from 
the  latter  type  of  model  in  Table  A4.    All  the  estimated  models  contain  controls  for 
background variables and economic orientation. A diagrammatic exposition of the results 
these three models are given in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2 HERE 
 
Figure 3 HERE 
 
Estimated female income differences over the GPA distribution are displayed in Figure 2. In 
the linear interaction model, the slope parameter is approximately 0.03, meaning that there is 
a 3 percent gain in the returns to entrance per decile increase in the GPA. The other two 
models  predict  approximately  the  same  outcome  around  the  middle  part  of  the  GPA 
distribution.  However,  at  the  endpoints,  the  regression  line  of  the  polynomial  interaction 
model differs from the others. We interpret this to mean that the polynomial model does not 
predict the data well at the end points of the sample. Male differences are smaller (see Figure 
3), the linear interaction model has a slope of approximately 0,1, and the slopes of the other 
two models are even flatter for the main part of the GPA distribution. Another important 
observation  is  that  the  regression  lines  in  the  flexible  models  are  not  monotonically 	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
increasing. However, the lowest achieving decile appear to fare worse than deciles 2 and 3, 




The income of the individuals in the sample is measured at a young age. At this age many 
young adults form families, and one may suspect that part of the sample is not working full 
time  for  reasons  related  to  preferences.  Since  one  potential  interest  lies  in  answering  the 
question if higher education admission is suitable to everyone, such voluntary restrictions to 
income may wrongly be interpreted as an effect of poor learning outcomes. One way to study 
potential problems associated with tastes for work is to reduce the sample by eliminating 
individuals with low income. Of course, it is difficult to choose a particular limit below which 
to consider individuals as voluntarily abstaining from work. We base our restriction on a 
comparison of earnings data with hours of work by Antelius and Björklund (2000), to choose 
120 000 SEK as the limit. Performing the same type of analyses as above, the results suggest 
that male differences are largely unaffected, while female earnings differences as well as the 
slope of the regression lines become smaller. The linear interaction effect is estimated to be 
about half that of the estimate for the original sample. However, the shape of the interaction 
effect, when estimated using the non-linear specifications, is similar to the original sample, 
being flatter in the middle parts of the distribution and steeper at the tails. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has presented an alternate approach to how to validate selection instruments to 
higher education. The idea was to avoid common problems in validation research – such as 
limitation of range and problematic criteria for academic success  - by including also students 
who did not enter higher education (by rejection or own choice) and use earnings as criterion 
for academic success. From a theoretical point of view, there is a close connection between 
the traditional definition of predictive validity, measured as the correlation between university 
achievement and prior grades, and the association between the earnings of university entrants 
and prior grades. We have used labour market information to assess if prior grades predict 
income premiums of entering university. The main results are the following: (i) the income 
premium at labour market entrance for university students is positive. However, it is larger for 
females than for males indicating that university education is economically more important 	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
for females; (ii) the gradient of the achievement interaction effect is small for a large part of 
the prior grade distribution, meaning that using upper secondary GPAs to predict who will 
benefit the most from university entrance is not very informative for a majority of the student 
population; (iii) in the tails of the prior grade distribution, the gradient is larger, indicating 
that the lowest achieving students (in terms of prior grades) are not successful students while 
high-achievers are. 
 
We also discussed possible caveats in interpreting the prior achievement interaction effect, 
and pointed out two possible selection mechanisms that may bias the estimated parameters, 
one being that there is a negative correlation, on the margin, between prior achievement and 
study motivation, and the other on that study motivation at different levels of the education 
system  may  be  positively  correlated.  Together  these  two  sources  mean  that  one  cannot 
generally tell if estimates of the prior achievement interaction effect are biased upwards or 
downward. Controlling for observable characteristics usually assumed to be correlated with 
motivation did not affect the results in any important way. 
 
The  results  of  the  paper  suggest  some  avenues  for  further  research.  First,  the  empirical 
connection  between  achievement  at  university  (university  GPA)  and  earnings  is  not  fully 
understood.  Where  available,  one  should  try  to  associate  earnings  with  achievement  at 
university directly to address this connection.  Second, the fact that the gradient of the prior 
achievement interaction effect is large at the lower tail of the prior grade distribution makes it 
interesting to study more thoroughly the academic success of poorly performing students. At 
the least, this is interesting from a policy point of view, since cuts in the number of student 
positions will affect this group the most. Third, our results are not directly applicable in a 
cost-benefit  analysis  of  higher  education;  higher  performing  students  generally  attain 
programs that involve higher direct costs as well as longer duration. In addition, wages at 
labour market entrance do not capture the entire effect from higher education over the entire 
life span. Therefore, to get a better estimate of the surplus from higher education, the costs 
and the program duration, as well as the income path, should be taken into account. Finally, 
there is an interest in comparing entrants with non-entrants in particular programs to see if 
different programs differ in the achievement interaction effect. In this paper, we did not have 
information about applicants. Future studies may well have access to such information.  
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Appendix 
 
Specifications of the prior achievement interaction effect  f(!) 
 
(i) Group differences 
f ENTRi,GPAi ( )= ! jENTRi + "j ( )
j=1
J
#         (A1) 
In this specification, the interaction effect is modelled in a stepwise fashion. Here,  j denotes 
the J different GPA groups,  !j  is a between group deviation from the linear association 
between  income  and  GPA,  and  ! j  the  percentage  income  difference  between  university 
entrants and non-entrants in group j.  
 
(ii) Piecewise linear function 
A linear spline function for the income differences is given by  
 







( ) ENTRi    (A2) 
where J is the number of segments of the piecewise linear function,  Djis a dummy variable 
taking the value one if  GPAi ! ! Gj!1 > 0  and zero otherwise, and  
! Gj!1is the (upper) threshold 
value  of  segment  j-1.  This  means  that  for  the  lowest  GPA  group  the  estimated  income 
difference between entrants and non-entrants is  !0 +!1GPAi , for the second lowest group 
 
!0 +!1GPAi +!2 GPAi " ! G1 ( ), and so on.  
 
(iii) Polynomial function 
In this case, the function f is specified as 








' ( ENTRi       (A3) 
where the expression within parenthesis captures the interaction effects, and where K denotes 
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Tables 
 
Table A1: Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Logarithm of income  The natural logarithm of income from employment and self-
employment in 2002 
Age  The age of the individual defined as 2003 minus the year of birth 
Father upper secondary  Dummy variable taking the value one if the father’s highest level of 
education is upper secondary education  
Father post secondary  Dummy variable taking the value one if the father has some 
postsecondary education and zero otherwise 
Mother upper secondary  Dummy variable taking the value on if the mother’s highest level of 
education is upper secondary education 
Mother post secondary  Dummy variable taking the value one if the mother has entered 
postsecondary education and zero otherwise 
First generation immigrant  Dummy variable taking the value on if the individual and both 
parents are born outside of Sweden  
Second generation immigrant  Taking the value on if the individual is born in Sweden and both 
parents are born outside of Sweden  
Upper secondary GPA  The grade point average from upper secondary education. GPA is 
measured on a scale one to five, where one is the lowest grade and 
five is the highest grade. In the empirical analysis students are 
percentile ranked according to GPA and placed on a scale zero to 
ten.  
Secondary GPA  The grade point average from upper secondary education. Grades 
are given on a scale one to five, where one is the lowest grade and 
five is the highest grade. 
Educational orientation  Upper secondary school programme. Educational orientation is 
constructed as 5 different dummy variables taking the value one if 
the individual attained a particular programme, and where the 
Social science programme is the reference group. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the key variables 
Variable  Females  Males 
  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Income  212.8 
(110.4) 
48 107  299.5 
(144.2) 
45 161 
Age  29.00 
(0.82) 
 
48 107  29.02 
(0.82) 
45 161 
Father upper secondary  0.308 
(-) 
39 414  0.308 
(-) 
37 679 
Father post secondary  0.361 
(-) 
39 414  0.402 
(-) 
37 679 
Mother upper secondary  0.295 
(-) 
44 242  0.280 
(-) 
41 312 
Mother post secondary  0.382 
(-) 
44 242  0.421 
(-) 
41 312 
First generation immigrant  0.023 
(-) 
47 575  0.025 
(-) 
44 629 
Second generation immigrant  0.029 
(-) 
47 575  0.027 
(-) 
44 629 
Upper secondary GPA  3.515 
(0.616) 
48 107  3.387 
(0.658) 
45 161 
Upper sec GPA, rank  5 
 
48 107  5  45 161 
Primary school GPA  3.914 
(0.787) 
47 128  3.757 
(0.775) 
44 324 
Note: Standard deviations are given within parentheses 
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Table A3: Income differences, piecewise linear interaction effects 
Parameter  Females  Males 
  Full model  Restricted model  Full model  Restricted model 
         
β0  -0.061 
(0.071) 



















β3  0.013 
(0.077) 


























β7  -0.063 
(0.048) 
-  -0.001 
(0.003) 
- 
β8  0.053 
(0.048) 
-  0.016 
(0.032) 
- 
β9  -0.004 
(0.048) 
-  -0.002 
(0.031) 
- 









2  0.053  0.053  0.067  0.067 
         
Note: The parameter estimates are based on the piecewise linear interaction model presented in equation A2. β0 
denotes the constant interaction parameter and β1-β10 the slope changes in comparison to the preceding decile 
group. Standard errors are presented within parenthesis. ** denotes statistically significant parameters on the 99 
percent level, * significance on the 95 percent level. The number of observations is 37 135 and 35 181 in the 
female and male equations, respectively. 
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Table A4: Income differences, polynomial interaction effects 
Parameter  Females  Males 
  7th grade  Linear model  5th grade  Linear model 
         
















γ2  -0.710** 
(0.261) 
-  -0.120** 
(0.036) 
- 
γ3  0.323** 
(0.120) 
-  0.026** 
(0.008) 
- 
γ4  -0.076** 
(0.029) 
-  -0.003** 
(0.001) 
- 
























-  -  - 
R
2  0.053  0.052  0.067  0.066 
         
Note: The parameter estimates are based on the polynomial interaction model presented in equation A3. γ0 
denotes the constant interaction parameter and γ1-γ10 linear and higher order interaction parameters. Standard 
errors are presented within parenthesis. ** denotes statistically significant parameters on the 99 percent level, * 
significance on the 95 percent level. The number of observations is 37 135 and 35 181 in the female and male 
equations, respectively. 
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Table 1: The percentage of university entrants in GPA quintile groups 
GPA quintile group  Entrants  Group size  Limit GPA 
Females       
Quintile 1  36.0  22.4  3.00 
Quintile 2  65.9  18.2  3.33 
Quintile 3  79.5  19.6  3.67 
Quintile 4  90.1  21.3  4.07 
Quintile 5  97.5  18.5  5.00 
All  73.0  100.0   
       
Males       
Quintile 1  30.8  20.8  2.82 
Quintile 2  59.9  19.7  3.19 
Quintile 3  79.0  20.4  3.53 
Quintile 4  91.4  20.9  4.00 
Quintile 5  97.9  18.2  5.00 
All  71.2  100.0   
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Table 2: Income in GPA quintile groups, 1000SEK 
GPA quintile group  Entrants  Non-entrants 
Females     




















     
Males     




















Note: Average income from employment and self-employment. Standard 
deviations within parentheses. 
 	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
 
Table 3: Income Differences (per cent) over Quintile GPA Groups; Females 
Estimate  I  II  III 
       






























       
Background controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Educ orientation  No  No  Yes 
       
R2  0.040  0.044  0.053 
NOBS  48105  37135  37135 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of income from employment and self-employment. 
Robust standard errors (White) are presented within parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4: Income Differences (per cent) over Quintile GPA Groups; Males 
Estimate  I  II  III 
       






























       
Background controls  No  Yes  Yes 
Educ orientation  No  No  Yes 
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R2  0.032  0.040  0.068 
NOBS  45160  35181  35181 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of income from employment and self-employment. 
Robust standard errors (White) are presented within parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5: Wald Tests of Restrictions on Income Differences over GPA Quintile Groups 
  Wald statistic 
Null hypothesis  Females  Males 
















Note: The tests are based on the estimates of specification III in Tables 3 and 4. The test is distributed as F(r,n-q) 
where r is the number of restrictions and n-q the number of degrees of freedom. P-values for accepting the null 




Figure 1: The relationship between selection instrument and criteria for academic success, 
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Figure 3: Estimated income differences; males 
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